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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
KAYLENE S. SMITH,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee,
APPELLATE CASE
NO: 9207500-CA
vs.

DISTRICT COURT CASE
NO: 910000459

ODELL M. SMITH, JR.,
PRIORITY: 15
Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (i) , stating that the Court
of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the
District Court involving domestic relations cases, including
but not limited to divorce and property division.
the Utah

Rules

of Appellate

Procedure

also

Rule 3 of

indicates a

procedure for taking appeals from judgments and orders of
trial

courts.

requirements

This

outlined

Appellant Proceduree

brief
in Rule

follows
24 of

the

the
Utah

structural
Rules of

This is an appeal by Odell M. Smith,

Jr., Defendant, from a judgment and Decree of Divorce.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in

making the award of alimony that it did.
2.

Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law are insufficient to support the award of alimony.

3.
Fact

Whether the Court properly entered its Findings of

and

Conclusions

of

Law

where

Defendant's

attorney

objected to certain findings but withdrew as counsel.
4.

Whether the Court erred in obligating Defendant to

pay an income tax liability.
5.

Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

are insufficient to support the award of attorney's fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
The Standard of Review on Appeal is that the Appellate
Court

must

reverse

misunderstanding
preponderates

of

if

there

the

law,

is
if

a

misapplication

the

evidence

or

clearly

against the findings or conclusions

or if

there is a serious inequity that must be rectified as set
forth in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Decree of Divorce
entered

by the Honorable Clint S. Judkins sitting

as a

District Court Judge on or about October 14, 1992.

R.

68-78 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
At

trial,

Plaintiff

(hereinafter

referred

to

as

"Kaylene") appeared and was represented by Attorney Jeff R.
Thome.

Defendant

(hereinafter

referred

to as

"Odell") ,

appeared and was represented by Attorney Brent E. Johns.

A

trial was held on the matter in which the only witnesses
were Kaylene, Odell and Kaylene's

daughter.

Judge Judkins

entered his decision on the day of trial and Plaintiff's

attorney prepared a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Decree of Divorce. (T. 173-178).
Kaylene's

attorney

prepared

a Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and forwarded same
to Odell's attorney on or about September 24, 1992.

R. 66.

(Letter to Brent Johns dated September 24, 1992.)

Odell's

attorney objected to paragraphs 10, 15, 16 and 17 of the
Findings

of Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law

and

Decree of

Divorce as set forth in his letter to Kaylene's attorney
dated October 1, 1992.
October 1, 1992.)
October 14, 1992.

R. 67 (Letter to Jeff Thorne dated

Odell's attorney withdrew as counsel on
R. 84 (Withdrawal of Counsel.)

Kaylene's

attorney forwarded, together with a letter to the Court the
Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
as well as Brent Johns letter of October 1, 1992. R. 65
(Letter to Judge Judkins dated October 5, 1992.)
attorney

then submitted

the Decree

Kaylene's

and Findings

without

making any of the changes suggested by Brent Johns, Odell's
attorney.

The Decree and Findings were submitted to Court

together with a letter which indicated in part that it was
being submitted for "either signing or modification as you
see fit".
1992.)

R. 65 (Letter to Judge Judkins dated October -5,

Judge Judkins made one change at paragraph 16 of the

Findings of Fact, signed the Decree of Divorce which was
entered on October 14, 1992. R. 68 - 83 (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, Decree of Divorce.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kaylene and

Odell met

in

the

summer

of

1980 when

Kaylene gained employment as a secretary at Odell*s Grain
Elevator operation.

Both parties were married

people at the time.

(T. 11 and 12)

to other

Some time later, the

relationship developed into a romantic relationship. (T. 12)
Kaylene obtained a divorce from her husband in 1983.

The

relationship continued on an irregular basis until Odell was
divorced.

Odell obtained a divorce from his wife in 1986.

(T. 13 and 69)

At that time, Odell assisted Kaylene in

moving to Brigham City, Utah in January of 1986. (T. 70)
Odell also moved into a separate residence in Brigham City,
Utah in June of 1986. (T. 70 and 71)

The parties maintained

separate residences but continued their relationship until
they were married on August 14, 1989. (T. 17 and 73 - 74)
The parties did not live together under one roof or hold
themselves

out

to me married

married in 1989.

until

the

time

they were

(T. p. 175)

Pursuant to his divorce from his former wife, Odell
received a settlement to compensate him for his interest in
the

family

farm

operation

which

received by Odell, was $249,000.00.

settlement,

actually

It is disputed as to

both the amount of settlement and as to how the amounts were
arrived at.

Odell did not work during the time of the

marriage, as a

result of a head

injury.

(T. p.

116)

Kaylene worked for Brigham Realty, Richard's Manufacturing
Jewelers and Weinstocks while the parties resided in Brigham
Citv. (T. p. 51 - 53).

Kaylene filed a Verified Complaint, Order to Show Cause
and Temporary Restraining Order on September 13, 1991 (R. 1
- 11). A trial was held on August 28, 1992, and the divorce
entered October 14, 1992. T.
Conclusions of Law)

68 - 78 (Findings of Fact and

Odell filed a timely appeal from this

decision on November 12, 1992. R.

85 and 86. (Notice of

Appeal)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Odell1s Appeal is primarily centered around three (3)
issues,

those

liability

being

and

alimony, division

attorney

fees.

The

of

an income tax

Court

abused

its

discretion in these areas or entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law which were not adequately supported by
the evidence or which were insufficient altogether.
It is also an issue as to whether the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law were appropriately entered, given the
Withdrawal

of Odell1s

attorney

simultaneous

to entry of

those Findings and Conclusions.
With regard to alimony, the Court erred in at least
three (3) aspects.

First, the findings are inadequate and

are not based upon the evidence at trial.
specifically

note

that

the

parties

did

The Findings
not,

prior

to

marriage, represent themselves to be husband and wife.

In

fact, this finding was a specific ruling wherein the Court
held that even though there was a long term relationship
there was no marriage relationship that existed prior to the
formal marriage of the parties. T. 175.

Not withstanding

this fact, the findings contained certain items which were
contested

to by Odell1s attorney.

at trial and objected

Those being the statement that it was commonly recognized by
Plaintiff's

family

that they were

"living

together" the

majority of the time for 1986 to the time they were married
and certain implications with regard to Kaylene's employment
being terminated based upon the wishes of Odell. R.
73, 77.

68, 69,

The findings and conclusions entered by the Court

simply are not supported by the evidence at trial and should
not have been entered based upon the objections by Odell's
attorney.
Second, the findings do not specifically note Odell1s
ability to earn income or his expenses.

The findings do

note what Kaylene's current income is but do not set forth
what her ability to earn income is.
Finally,

the

Court

further

erred

in

its

award

of

alimony based upon an error which the Court made at trial in
failing to allow Odell to introduce certain documents which
had great bearing on the terms of the parties pre-marital
relationship and upon Kaylene's veracity.

These documents,

Odell's exhibit 4 and 5.
Odell will
erred

further show, on appeal, that the Court

in requiring him to pay

the income tax liability

incurred as a result of Kaylene taking an income tax refund
and cashing the check when that refund should have been
returned to the State Tax Commission as a result of the
parties filing an amended and joint income tax return.

The final issue on appeal is attorney fees which were
inappropriately

awarded

on the

basis

that

showing of need by Kaylene, for that award.

there

was no

The Court in

this case entered findings which preponderate against the
actual evidence

taken at trial and which resulted

serious inequity between the parties.

in a

As such, the case

should be reversed and remanded.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS AWARD OF
ALIMONY.
The Court should remand this case for further findings
with regard to alimony or should reverse the alimony award
altogether on the basis that the Findings and Conclusions
entered below are not sufficient to support the alimony
award.

In the alternative, the Court should reverse with

regard to alimony on the basis that the evidence at trial
preponderates against the finding of alimony entered by the
Court.
A.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are

inadequate to support the award of alimony.
The factors that a Court must consider in making an
award of alimony are well established in recent case law.
These factors are 1, the financial conditions and needs of
the wife; 2, the ability of the wife to produce an income
for herself; and 3, the ability of the husband to provide

support. See
1985) .

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d

1072, 1075

(Utah

In viewing the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law then, this Court must consider whether the Findings
address each of those factors.
The first factor is the financial conditions and needs
of the wife.

This

factor is probably

the most clearly

addressed in the findings of fact which are as follows:
1.

Prior to the parties marriage the Plaintiff

was working and earning net income of approximately
$1,000.00
$1,000.00

per

month.

during

Plaintiff

this

marriage.

also

was

The

earning
Plaintiff

terminated her employment and Plaintiff is now only
making approximately $400.00 income per month. R. 73
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)
2.
monthly

That the Plaintiff needs income on an average
basis

of

$1,162.00

to

enable

her

to

live

similar to how she lived during the marriage and to
meet her current living expenses and obligations. R. 73
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)
3»

The

Plaintiff

has

suffered

an

economic

disadvantage as a result of the marriage in that she
does not have as good employment as she had before the
marriage and during the marriage before she quit her
employment at the urging of the Defendant... . R. 77
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)
With

regard

to

the

second

factor, that

being

the

ability of the wife to produce an income for herself, there
is no specific finding except as otherwise listed above.
There is also no specific finding as to Odell's ability
to provide support.

The only thing mentioned with regard to

Odell's financial situation was the amounts of money that he
received

prior to this marriage as a settlement

divorce

from

his

former

wife.

This

from a

settlement

was

specifically to compensate Odell for his share of marital
assets in the first marriage.
Conclusions of Law).

R. 70 (Findings of Fact and

The only other finding or conclusion

of law with regard to Odell's earning potential was that
there was some interest earned on bank accounts at First
Security Bank in Idaho.

However, the Court specifically

found that that income was dissipated in living expenses
during the time the parties were married. R. 77 (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law)
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that the trial
court must make findings on all material issues.
Deliran, 737 P.2nd 996 (Utah 1987).

Acton v.

These findings should

be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
which factual issue was reached. Stevens v. Stevens, 754
P.2nd 952, 958 (Utah 1988). Quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598
P.2nd 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).
In the case at bar, the only specific finding as to the
financial condition and the need of Kaylene was that she had

a need of living expenses in the amount of $1,162.00 per
month.

There is no finding as to her ability to produce

income simply that she was, at the time of trial, earning
$400.00 per month as opposed to the $1,000.00 per month
which she had earned prior to and during the marriage.

The

Court completely failed to enter adequate findings as to the
ability of Odell to provide support.

All the Court finds in

this regard is that he has assets which he acquired to
marriage.

The Supreme Court has clearly held that Findings

of Fact made by the trial court which fail to specifically
set forth the paying spousels

financial condition, income

and ability to pay are insufficient. Stevens, at 958.

There

is no specific finding as to how much Odell makes on a
monthly basis or what his ability to pay is relative to his
own living expenses.
The Court

further

erred

in entering

a finding and

conclusion which, by its own terms is contradictory.

Judge

Judkins, scratched out a portion of paragraph 16 of the
Findings of Fact and eliminated language which says that
Plaintiff terminated her employment because of the wishes
and desires of the Defendant.

Not withstanding this fact,

the Court allowed as a conclusion of law that Plaintiff had
suffered

an

economic

disadvantage

as

a

result

of

the

marriage and that she does not have as good as employment as
she had before the marriage and during the marriage before
she quit her employment at the urging of the Defendant.

R.

77 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) .
statements

contradict

statements

excluded,

themselves.
the

findings

Even
are

not

These two

were

these

support

by

evidence at trial.
The evidence showed that the parties had a marriage
which lasted from August 14, 1989 to approximately August of
1991

when

complaint

the
was

parties
filed.

were

separated

Further, Odell

and

a

verified

testified

that, at

least a portion of that two (2) year marriage Kaylene did
not live with him on a steady basis. T. 103 - 110.

The

Court abused its discretion in ordering Odell to pay alimony
of almost $29,000.00 on a two (2) year marriage, where he
has no independent source of income other than pre-marital
assets

or

social

security

and

where

that

marriage

was

centered around a relationship which can best be described
as sporadic.
B.

The Court erred in entering the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law when those Findings and Conclusions
were disputed.
Kaylene1s attorney prepared the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and forwarded those to Odell*s attorney
on September 24, 1992.

R. 66.

Odell*s attorney replied by

a letter dated October 1, 1992, indicating that he disagreed
with

the

Findings

at paragraph

10, 15, 16 and

17 and

paragraph 14 of the Decree of Divorce on the basis that they
appeared more as arguments at Court rather than specific

Findings.
1992).

R. 67. (Letter to Jeff Thorne dated October 1,

Rather than revise the Findings, Kaylene's attorney

submitted them to the Court with a letter to Judge Judkins
dated October 5, 1992 with a notation that "it appears that
we are not able to agree as to what should be placed in the
Findings and Conclusions; therefore, I am submitting them to
you for either signing or modification as you see fit". The
Court made one change to paragraph 16 of the Findings of
Fact and made no changes to the Decree of Divorce.
83

R. 73 -

(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of

Divorce).

Without other dealings or input as to the content

of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Odell's
attorney withdrew as counsel on October 14, 1992.
Two (2) errors were committed throughout this course of
events.

First, Odell's attorney should have objected under

Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, to
the proposed Findings, Judgments and Decree.

Second, the

Court should not have modified the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law without a hearing on the matter.

As set

forth above, certain of the Findings especially with regard
to alimony took the form of arguments at trial rather than
actual findings of the Court.

Notwithstanding this fact,

they were entered as the court's findings without hearing or
other input by Odell's attorney.

As such, the Findings are

against

the weight

of the evidence

entered

under Rule

4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial

Administration.

and

are improperly

C.

The Court erred in failing to allow admission of

certain evidence.
Kaylene testified at trial the parties entered into a
relationship in 1980 which became intimate in approximately
January

of

relationship

1981.

From

"continued

that

on

a

point
regular

forward
basis"

that

the

during

the

entire time that Kaylene worked for Odell. T. 12.

Kaylene

further testified that marriage was "talked about all the
time",

T. 13, and that when Odell moved to Brigham that he

was living with Kaylene until he bought a separate residence
and that they had a regular relationship going on "month
after month after month". T. 15, 16. Kaylene later admitted
on cross-examine that they did see other people for a period
of time in 1988, that they were not living as husband and
wife from the period of 1986 to 1988 and that she "saw one
other man and was with him maybe two (2) times".
44.

T. 41 -

Kaylene further testified that Odell never spent time

staying with his parents during the time that the parties
lived in Brigham. T. 42.

Most of these statements were

contradicted by Odell.
Odell
relationship
uncertain".

testified
was

on

direct

"explosive

T. 77.

and

examination

that

unpredictable

and

the
very

Odell further testified that he moved

directly into the Condominium in Brigham and, impliedly, did
not live with Kaylene for a period of two (2) months. T. 73.
Odell testified that he spent a great deal of time at his

parents home and spent the night there at least twice a
week. T. 81 - 85.

Odell further testified, in contradiction

to Kaylene's testimony that he did not want her to quit her
job at Brigham Realty and did not want her to quit her job
at Richard's Manufacturing Jewelers. T. 99 and 100.
Odell*s attorney attempted to admit into evidence, a
letter marked Defendant's exhibit #4, which was a letter to
Kaylene's girlfriend in Idaho and dated January 7, 1990.
Odell testified that he found the letter in the garbage
where it was torn up and that he pieced it together.
first page of exhibit #4 was read into evidence.

The

Odell*s

attorney also attempted to admit exhibit #5, another letter
from Kaylene to her parents and dated January 5, 1990 into
evidence.

This letter was also found in the trash where it

had been torn up and was also pieced back together by Odell.
At trial, the following exchange took place:
MR. THORNEi Well, again, your honor, I guess I am
having some problem. If I understand both of these,
these were written and may have expressed her thought
process, but she tears them up and doesn't send them
and communicated them.
THE COURT: How is it material what she threw in the
garbage? If they had received the letters, maybe, but
she throws them in the garbage.
MR. JOHNSi It is material in that it shows her thought
processes. It shows her commitment to the marriage, in
the case of this first one. This one will show her
relationship with Odell regarding the job. This one
will go on an entirely different track, your honor,
because this one is going to show, and what we are
offering this for, is to show the quitting of the job
at Nordstrom and at Richards Manufacturing Jewelers was
at her desire and her interest, counter to her previous
testimony on the stand.
Now that's what this
particular letter is going to go for.
MR. THORNEr Well —

MR. JOHNSi
And their statements to that fact.
THE COURT: I am going to sustain the objection. If
the letter had been delivered then it would be a
different situation, but where she wrote a letter and
threw it away, obviously torn up, I don't see that
that's material. I am going to sustain the objection,
unless you can show anything else. T. 9 6 - 9 7 .
Neither
evidence.

exhibit
Brent

4 or

exhibit

Johns,

Odell's

5 was

admitted

attorney

into

specifically

pointed out that the letters go to Kaylene's veracity and
contradicts her previous testimony.

T. 94.

The Court apparently declined to admit these letters
into evidence on the basis that they were thrown away rather
than delivered.
It is not certain as to what rule of evidence the Court
relied on in declining to allow these letters into evidence.
Since the Court made inquiry as to the letters relevance it
is assumed that the letters were not admitted into evidence
on the basis of relevance.
Rule

However, relevant evidence under

401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

"means evidence

having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable
evidence".
evidence

Utah
is

Rules

relevant

then it would be without the

of
then

Evidence
all

Rule

402.

relevant

If

the

evidence

is

admissible unless its probative value is substantially out
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
of Evidence Rules 402 & 403.

See, Utah Rules

In the case at bar there is no

evidence as to whether the probative value of these letters

were

substantially

prejudice.

out weighed

by

the danger

of

unfair

It is not certain whether the Court declined to

admit them into evidence on the basis of relevancy.
The second option as to the Courts failure to admit
these letters is under some notion that they do not go the
credibility of the witness or the witnesses veracity as
by Odell1s

submitted

attorney.

The

letters were

to be

admitted to show differences in what Kaylene had written in
the letters regarding seeing other men and her statements
regarding Odell urging her to quit her jobs.

Rule 613 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure governs prior statements of
witnesses.

613 (b) provides as follows:

Extrinsic
evidence
of a prior
inconsistent
statement by a witness is not admissible unless the
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny
the same and the opposite party is afforded an
opportunity
to interrogate him thereon, or the
interests of justice otherwise require.
In
admitted

the

case

into

at bar, the

evidence

on

letters

cross

should

examination

have been
of

Odell.

Kaylene would have then had the opportunity to explain or
deny the letters on redirect examination and Odell given the
opportunity

to

interrogate

her

on

recross

examination.

Odell%s attorney chose to introduce the letters on a direct
examination assumedly so that a foundation could be laid as
to

how

the

letters

were

obtained.

This

would

still,

however, give Kaylene the opportunity to explain or deny the
content of the letters.
Because the Court declined to admit the letters into

evidence, Kaylene's veracity was not necessarily called into
question and important contradictions in her testimony were
not allowed into evidence.
D.

The

Court

erred

in

awarding

alimony

out

of

pre-marital assets.
As indicated above the Court made no finding as to
Odell1 s source of income.
assume

that alimony

It is therefore reasonable to

is paid

out

of

assets which

received as a settlement from his prior marriage.

Odell

There is

no dispute that all of the assets received by Odell arose
from the relationship with his previous wife, the sale of
the farm or the purchasing of Odell1s interest in that farm.
There

is, likewise, no

issue

that

the

assets were not

co-mingled.
When a Decree of Divorce is entered, the Court may
include in it "equitable orders relating to the children,
property and parties ... ".

U.C.A. 30-3-5(1) (1989).

The

purpose of property division is to allocate property in the
manner which best serves the needs of the parties and best
permits

them

to pursue

Novel, 761 P.2d

their

1369, 1373

separate

lives.

Nobel v.

(Utah 1988) Quoting Burke v.

Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).

The Utah Court of

Appeals set out a standard and list of factors generally
considered in fashioning a property division where part or
all of the property

is pre-marital property. Walters v.

Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 1991).

In the Walters

case, the Court set forth approximately twelve (12) factors
which

should

property.

be

considered

in making

a distribution of

These factors, and their relevance to the case at

bar are set forth below:
1.

The amount and kind of property to be divided:

The

only property at issue herein was the payments received by
Odell

which

property

constituted

which

he held

either

earnings

in common with

off

the

his ex-wife, or

principal or interest from the sale of that property.
of the property

also

includes

five

farm

Part

(5) certificates of

deposit with First Security Bank in Idaho held jointly with
Odell and his children.

Each account having an initial

deposit of $36,000.00.
2.

Whether the property was acquired before or during

the marriage:

Odell received a portion of this settlement

prior to marriage in the form of a $30,000.00 lump sum
payment in April of 1986 and thereafter 3 or 4 payments of
$25,000.00 each.

The remainder of the proceeds from his

prior divorce settlement was not actually received until
March of 1991.
3.

The source of the property:

There is no dispute

that the source of the property was from a settlement on
Odell4s previous divorce. -It is uncertain as to whether the
money

constituted

earnings

off

the

farm

property

or

principal and interest from the sale of that property.
4.

The health of the parties:

The only testimony in

this regard was that Kaylene would be required to undergo a
hysterectomy or a D&C and that Odell had been hit in the
head approximately three (3) years prior to trial which has
caused him to be unable to work.
5.

The

parties

standard

of

living,

respective

financial conditions, needs and earning capacity:

As set

forth above, there was no specific finding as to either
parties earning capacity except that Kaylene had earned both
before and during the marriage at least $1,000.00 per month.
Odell had no income, per se, except for social security.
Odell remained in the marital home but it is uncertain as to
each of the parties standard of living.
6.

The duration of the marriage:

approximately

two

(2) years

until

The marriage lasted

Kaylene

filed

for a

divorce.
7.

The

children

of

the

marriage:

There

were

no

children of the marriage.
8.
divorce i

The parties ages at the time of the marriage and of
It is not certain as to the parties ages it is

only certain that Odell is 15 years older than Kaylene.

T.

116.
9.

What the parties gave up by the marriage:

uncertain what the parties gave up by the marriage.

It is
Both

parties moved from their homes in Idaho to obtain homes in
Brigham City.

Odell had purchased a condominium in Brigham

City which he had to sell at a loss.

T. 76.

Odell did not

work during the course of the marriage, Kaylene worked full
time during the marriage, quit that job and was working part
time at trial.
10.

Necessary relationship the property division has

with the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded:
There is no child support so that is not an issue.

There is

a direct relationship between the property division and the
amount of alimony because alimony could not paid from any
other source.

Odell had no source of income other than a

small amount of social security which he was receiving or
was about to receive.

The only way that alimony could be

paid would be out of the property division.
11.
towards

Whether

one

spouse

has

made

any

contribution

the growth of the separate assets of the other

spousei

Odell testified

that Kaylene made no

financial

contribution to the marriage and that any money earned by
her was kept by her with the exception of paying a phone
bill.

T. 105, 106.

There is no dispute that Kaylene did

not make any contribution toward the settlement money as
received from Odell*s prior divorce.
12.

Whether the assets were accumulated or enhanced by

the joint efforts of the parties:

It is undisputed that the

only asset accumulated by the parties was the home.

No

other assets were accumulated or enhanced by joint effort of
the parties.
by

Odell

Specifically, the settlement monies received

were

received,

maintained,

and

used

entirely

separate from Kaylene.
The Court of Appeals in the Walters case noted that the
last two (2) factors were of particular concern.

Further

that the trial court can reallocate pre-marital property as
part

of a property

exist".

division where

"unique circumstances

Walters at 67.

In the case at bar, Kaylene made no contribution toward
growth of separate assets, made no effort to accumulate the
assets or to enhance its value.

This situation is not so

"unique" as to justify the award of alimony from pre-marital
assets.

The court should not have awarded Kaylene alimony

which, of necessity, had to have been paid out of the
separate assets.

This has effectively

awarded Kaylene a

portion of the pre-marital property which she could not have
gotten as property.

It would have been inappropriate to

award Kaylene a portion of those assets as personal property
and it is likewise

inappropriate to award Kaylene those

assets even though that award takes the form of alimony.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING ODELL TO INCUR
THE INCOME TAX LIABILITY.
The Court, without explanation required Odell to pay
the income tax liability to the State of Utah or the IRS for
all

years

during

the

marriage.

This

Court's

language with regard to the income tax liability

specific
in its

entirety
liability

is

"the

whatever

Defendant

shall

pay

the

it was, that $227.00".

income
There

tax,
is

no

finding as to why Odell was required to pay that income tax
liability and no comment made on the testimony regarding
that income tax liability.
Testimony

at

trial

indicated

that

the

income

tax

liability resulted because Kaylene filed a separate income
tax return and

received

a tax

refund.

Odell persuaded

Kaylene to file a joint income tax return by means of filing
an amended return.

Kaylene cashed the income tax refund

against the wishes of Odell, and did not refund that amount
to the State of Utah.

T. 108 - 109 and 6 2 - 6 4 .

Odell

submits that the trial court erred in ordering him to incur
that income tax liability when the liability arose solely
because Kaylene inappropriately kept an income tax refund
and cashed it.

Had she not taken this action, there would

have been no other liability in dispute.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING ODELL TO PAY
ATTORNEY FEES.
Under Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3

(1989) a court may

award attorney fees in a divorce proceeding.
award

attorney

fees,

the

trial

court

"In order to

must

find

the

requesting party is in need of financial assistance and that
the fees requested are reasonable."
P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1991) .

Walters v. Walters, 812

The Court, in the findings of fact and conclusions of
law

with

regard

to

attorney

fees

simply

provided

that

Plaintiff is awarded $2,000.00 attorney fees and judgment
shall enter against the Defendant in favor of the Plaintiff
in said amount,
Law)

R. 76 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

In its actual ruling, the Court simply stated that

"the Court is going to award $2,000.00 attorney's fees in
behalf of the Plaintiff".

T. 174.

There is no finding as

to Kaylene's financial need or as to the reasonableness of
the request.
supported.
1962) .

The award of attorney's fees is inadequately
See, Anderson v. Anderson, 368 P.2d 264 (Utah

In addition no finding was entered with regard to

the ability of Odell to pay attorney's fees as also required
by §30-3-3 of the Utah Code and under case law.

See Rasband

v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

In

the case of Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) ,

the Utah Court of Appeals discussed an award of

attorney fees.

"The Court made no findings on wife's need

for the payment of her fees, husband's ability to pay the
fees, or the reasonableness of the attorney fees."

Bell at

p.494.
In

the

immediate

case, there

is

no

finding

as to

Kaylene's need for the payment of her fees, Odell's ability
to pay the fees or the reasonableness of the attorney's
fees.

In fact, reasonableness of the attorney's fees was

disputed by counsel in closing argument.

T. 169, 169. As a

result, the Court should reverse the trial court's decision
with regard to attorney fees,
CONCLUSION
The trial Court has abused its discretion and, as a
result, a serious inequity has occurred in this case.

The

initial order which proved to be inequitable was that of
alimony.

The Court awarded Kaylene alimony in spite of the

fact that the marriage only lasted for approximately two (2)
years and without finding as to Kaylene1s ability to support
herself.

Any alimony paid would, of necessity, come out of

Odell*s property which he received

as settlement

from a

prior marriage and which was specifically found not to be a
marital asset.

There was no order entered with regard to

Odell*s ability to pay alimony.

The Findings of Fact, which

were disputed, are inadequate to support the Court's award.
As a result, the Court abused its discretion with regard to
alimony.
The second inequity from the Court's ruling is with
regard to the income tax liability.

That tax liability was

incurred as a result of bad faith on the part of Kaylene and
for no other reason.

Odell should not be obligated to pay

for her mistakes.
Finally,

the

Court

attorney's

fees.

No

Kaylene's

need,

Odell *s

erred

in

awarding

facts were entered
ability

to

Kaylene

with regard
pay

or

as

her
to
to

reasonableness of the fee.
case

should

be reversed

Based upon these reasons the

and

remanded

on

each

of

these

issues.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this TA

day of June, 1993.

VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & BRADLEY

rney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

T/

day of June, 1993,

I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the above
and foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF by hand delivering same to
the following:

JEFF R. THORNE
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main
P.O. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302

FOOTNOTES
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All references are to the pages of the original
record as paginated by the Clerk of the District Court,
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All documents in the record referred to will be found in the
Appendix in the order referred to in the Brief. For purpose
of clarity, the following abbreviations shall be adopted by
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"R." refers to the record with its page number and
title of the document in parenthesis.
"T." refers to the transcript.
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Jeff R. Thome of Mann, Hadfield & Thome #3250
Attorney for Plaintiff
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main
P. O. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876
Telephone: 723-3404
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KAYLENE S. SMITH,

]

Plaintiff,

]|

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ODELL M. SMITH, JR.,

))

Civil No. 910000459DA

Defendant.

(

vs.

Judge Clint S. Judkins

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 28th
day of August, 1992 at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m.

The

plaintiff was personally present and was represented by her
counsel of record, Jeff R. Thome of the firm of Mann, Hadfield
and Thorne.

The defendant was present and was represented by his

counsel, Brent E. Johns.

The plaintiff introduced her evidence

and testified in said matter; and the defendant introduced his
evidence and testified in said matter.

The court being fully

familiar in the premises issues the following Findings of Fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO MARRIAGE

The parties have had a romantic relationship beginning in 1980.
From 1986 and continuing up to the date the parties were married

Smith vs Smith, #910000459
Findings & Conclusions
on August 14, 1989 at Challis, Idaho the parties spent the
majority of each week living together.

Even though the parties

had an intimate relationship, the parties did not represent
themselves to be husband and wife to their friends or to their
family.

It was commonly recognized by plaintiff's family that

they were "living together" the majority of time from 1986 to the
time they were married.

The parties relationship contributed to

each party's divorce from their prior spouses.
DATE OP MARRIAGE
2.

The plaintiff and defendant were married on August 14,

1989 at Challis, Idaho.
NO CHILDREN
3.

No children have been born as issue of said marriage

and none are expected.
RESIDENCE OF PARTIES
4.

The plaintiff and the defendant are residents of Box

Elder County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three
months immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
5.

During the course of the marriage and the months

preceding the filing of the action, irreconcilable differences
developed such that the very purposes of the marriage were
destroyed.

2

Smith vs Smith, #910000459
Findings & Conclusions
DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY FROM PRIOR MARRIAGE
6.

Odell Smith was divorced from his former wife, Renae

Smith in March, 1986 in the State of Idaho.

As part of his

written settlement agreement with his first wife, Odell Smith was
entitled to cash payments of $210,000.00 and $150,000.00.

The

prior divorce decree provided that the $210,000.00 was to be paid
$30,000.00 on or before April 20, 1986, $30,000.00 upon the
closing of a loan (the terms of the loan were mentioned in the
decree), $150,000,000 payable in annual payments of $25,000.00
per year including interest at the rate of eight percent annum
from the date of March 27, 1986.

Additionally, Mr. Smith was to

be paid by his former wife an additional $150,000.00 within five
years from the date of the divorce.

The payments were to

compensate Mr. Smith for his share of the marital assets in his
first marriage.

Mr. Smith, also, received other assets under his

prior divorce.
ASSETS IN BANKS AT TIME OF THE DIVORCE
7.

At the time the divorce action was filed, there was in

an account in the name of Odell M. Smith with American First
Credit Union a balance of $41,275.00 as of September 14, 1991,
together with a share savings account in the amount of $9,532.16.
Mr. Smith testified at one time Kaylene's name was on his
checking account, but he removed it because "she spent too much.11

3

Smith vs Smith, #910000459
Findings & Conclusions
Odell Smith also had five different certificates of deposit with
First Security Bank in Challis, Idaho.

The money was deposited

on March 27, 1991, each account had initial deposit of $36,000,00
and which accrued interest at the rate of 6.83% per annum.
accounts totalled $180,000.00 on March 17, 1992.

These

Mr. Smith

testified the money for these accounts came from payments from
his first wife.
CHALLIS PROPERTY
8.

Odell Smith also received a cabin and real property in

Challis, Idaho, which came from his divorce settlement with his
first wife.
$249.120.93 PAYMENT RECEIVED DURING THIS MARRIAGE
9.

Odell Smith received the sum of $249,120.93 on or about

March 27, 1991 from his former wife and/or son for his share of
any interest in the farm properties he was awarded under his
prior divorce decree.

Mr. Smith was unable to articulate how the

amount of money was computed.

He was unable to state whether

the money constituted earnings off the farm property which he
held in common with his ex-wife or whether it was all principal
or interest from the sale of the property.
HOME PURCHASED IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO MARRIAGE
10.

A home was purchased at 70 North 200 East, Brigham

City, Utah on June 27, 1989, approximately six weeks prior to the
time the parties were married.

Title to the home was only in Mr.
4

Smith vs Smith, #910000459
Findings & Conclusions
Smithfs name.

The home was purchased with Mrs. Smith's consent

and knowledge and was the marital home of the parties.

The

parties stipulated that the home had a market value of
$63,000.00, and there exists a lien against the home in the
approximate amount of $29,000,00.

A $25,000.00 down payment was

made by the defendant out of his separate funds.

The court

determines that there is a $9,000.00 equity in the family home.
AUTOMOBILE PURCHASED DURING MARRIAGE
11.

In July, 1991 a 1991 Dodge Shadow automobile was

purchased, which has a fair market value of $7,000.00.

The

automobile was purchased with funds from the checking account
with America First Credit Union account.
LOT AND STORAGE PURCHASED IN 1986
12.

The defendant purchased a lot and storage building in

1986 in Brigham City, Utah.

The lot and building has a fair

market value of $18,500.00.

This real estate was titled in Mr.

Smith's name.
PERSONAL PROPERTY BEFORE MARRIAGE
13.

The plaintiff had a table and four chairs, a roll-top

desk, a couch, a green rocker, a square end table, a bathroom
bench, and a green hanging lamp, which was her property before
the marriage which was taken to the cabin in Challis, Idaho after
the parties were married.

5

Smith vs Smith, #910000459
Findings & Conclusions
PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE
14.

During the marriage, the parties purchased a three-

piece white leather furniture set, two area rugs, a grandfather
clock, a toaster, various wall hangings, a silk flower
arrangement, and vacuum.
MEDICAL NEEDS OF PLAINTIFF
15.

The plaintiff is in need of surgery pursuant to a

letter of Dr. C. M. Dibble, M.D. which was admitted into
evidence.

Plaintiff's medical condition requiring surgery arose

during this marriage.
EMPLOYMENT OF PLAINTIFF
16.

Prior to the parties' marriage, the plaintiff was

working and earning net income of approximately $1,000.00 per
month.

Plaintiff also was earning $1,000.00 during this C 0u(O

marriage.

The plaintiff terminated her employment because of te

wLblrea and UeJllUb uJU Lhe dgfSH35f*fc and plaintiff is now only
making approximately $400.00 income per month.
LIVING EXPENSES OF PLAINTIFF
17.

The plaintiff needs income on an average monthly basis

of $1,162.00 to enable her to live similar to how she lived
during the marriage and to meet her current living expenses and
obligations.

6

Smith vs Smith, #910000459
Findings & Conclusions
SOCIAL SECURITY AVAILABILITY TO DEFENDANT
18.

The defendant is eligible for social security, but has

not applied for social security at the present time.

The

defendant states that he would be entitled to social security of
approximately $350.00 per month.

The defendant has not been

employed during the time the parties have been married.
DEBTS
19.

The only debts are the debt existing against the home

in Brigham City, Utah.
AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT
THE COURT CONCLUDES:
MARRIAGE PROPERTY
1.

The only joint property the parties have acquired

during the time of the marriage is the equity in the home which
was purchased.

The court sets the equity at $9,000.00.

The

defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $4,500.00 within 60 days as
and for her share of the equity.
AUTOMOBILE
2.

The 1991 Dodge automobile was purchased with the

defendant's separate funds.

The automobile will be awarded to

the defendant.

PERSONAL PROPERTY
7

Smith vs Smith, #910000459
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3.
vacuum.

The plaintiff shall be awarded the loveseat, chair and
The defendant shall receive the remainder of the items

acquired during the marriage.
PERSONAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED PRIOR TO MARRIAGE
4.

The plaintiff shall be entitled to the items of

property which were taken to the cabin in Challis, Idaho which
were hers prior to the time the parties married.

Those items of

property are the table and four chairs, roll-top desk, couch,
green rocker, square end table, bathroom bench, and green hanging
lamp.

The defendant shall return those items to plaintiff within

10 days.
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS
5.

The defendant shall be awarded the Bible, the carved

Bible stand, the Revere Ware, the five quart pan with lilac
handles, the pressure cooker, the knife block and paring knives,
as well as any of his cassette tapes which may be in plaintiff's
possession.

All other items of personal property which plaintiff

has in her possession shall remain hers and shall be her sole and
separate property.

PLAINTIFF'S UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES

8
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6.

The defendant shall pay any medical expenses related to

plaintiff's surgery not covered by insurance, if those expenses
are incurred within the next six (6) months.
LOT AND STORAGE SHED
7.

The court finds that the lot and storage shed were

purchased by separate funds by the defendant and are awarded to
him.
HOME
8.

The home of the parties is awarded to the defendant

subject to a lien in the amount of $4,500.00 to be paid by the
defendant to the plaintiff within 60 days from the date of this
hearing.
INCOME TAX LIABILITY
9.

The defendant shall pay the income tax liability to the

State of Utah or IRS for all years during the marriage.
PLAINTIFF RESTORED TO FORMER NAME
10.

The plaintiff has requested that she be restored to her

former name of Koyle and the plaintiff's name shall henceforth be
and she shall be known as Kathleen S. Koyle.
ATTORNEY FEES
11.

The plaintiff is awarded $2,000.00 attorney's fees and

judgment shall enter against the defendant in favor of the
plaintiff in said amount.

9

Smith vs Smith, #910000459
Findings & Conclusions
INTEREST ON 8AVING3 ACCOUNT
12.

The court finds that any interest earned on the

$180,000.00 at First Security Bank in Idaho was marital property,
but that income was dissipated in living expenses during the time
the parties were married.
EXTRA MARITAL AFFAIR
13.

Even though the parties had a long-term relationship,

the majority of that time was spent as an extra marital rather
than a marriage relationship.
ALIMONY
14.

The plaintiff has suffered an economic disadvantage as

a result of the marriage in that she does not have as good as
employment as she had before the marriage and during the marriage
before she quit her employment at the urging of the defendant.
The plaintiff is entitled to alimony for four years. Alimony is
twice as long as the length of the marriage.

The court will,

however, give the defendant credit for one year of alimony
inasmuch as they have been separated and the defendant has been
paying temporary alimony since September, 1991.

The defendant

shall pay alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $643.00
beginning with the month of September, 1992 for a period of one

10

Smith vs Smith, #910000459
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year, or until August of 1993

Thereafter, he shall, pay a.l i.mony

in the amount of ShOU.OO per mm

the next two years or up

until August of 1995.
DATED this _./^'/.. day of
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CLBJT^S-^JUDKINS
DISTRICT .TTTnGE PRO TEM
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
B r e n t E. J o h n s

Attorney for Defendant
pj'/3:smith-k.fnd
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P. O. B O X
B R I G H A M CITY, U T A H
T E L E P H O N E (SOU
FAX (SOI)

H"in"!Ml ll'l

MAIN
876
84302-0876
723-3404

723-8807

September 24, 1992

j 0 hns
2411 Kiesel Avenue, Su i t R 1111

B r e n t E<

OGDEN U T 84401
Rp"

Si in :i th » '« Son t- h

Dear Brent:
Enclosed you will find H I P f
1.
The original and one copy or the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
2.

The original and one copy of the Decree of Divorce.

Would you please approve the documents as to form and retur n
them to me as soon as possible and I will have them filed with
the court..
If you have any changes which you think should be made,
please contact me as soon as possible and we wi 1 1 try to get the
changes made that we can agree to.
Very truly yours,
nkiili

By,.

JRT/pj
Enclosures
pi/1:Johns-b.ks

IIAMFIELU

> I IH'JRUE

APPENDIX C

ATTORNEY AT LAW
2411 Kiesel Ave.
Suite 101
Ogden, Utah 84401-2391
(801) 394-5581
FAX (801) 394-5583

October 1

1992

Jeff R. Thorne
Attorney at Law
Zions Bank Building
P.O. Box 876
Brigham Ci t;y , * *
RE:
TV,-* r

Smith vs

Wnith

U"> f *" •

In response to the Findings and Decree you prepared for the above
referenced divorce, T have some concerns.
Particularly, the -ending of paragraphs 10, 15, 1 6 and 1 7 of the
Conclusions and paragraph 14 of the Decree.
These paragraphs
appear to be more the arguments presented in Coiii: t rather than the
Courtf s findings,
i ui.ucistand that you picked up a copy of the Court's transcript
oi; the hearing.
Would you please either review it again and
incorporate more precisely what the Judge said rather than the
arguments, or send a copy of i t on to me so that I may revi ew it
Thank you for your consideration.
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ATTORNEY AT LAW
2411 Kiesel Ave.
Suite 101
Ogden, Utah 84401-2391
(801)394-5581
FAX (801) 394-5583
October

9,

1992

Jeff R. Thorne
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 876
Brigham Citv. v ^ h

- *

^m 11 h vs. oiiii1 ii

b-\' .
Dear Jeff:

Thank you for sending the copy of the Court transcript
After
reviewing it, I believe the changes I have requested are in line.
I have made the chdnqes on the original Findings and Decree and am
r •-• turn i nq !••':*-»• * • *•
Findings of Fact Paragraph 10; Th<-f •- w : •• r . :-:..;'. ~,n ^i evidence
that the horn** u-,- purchased with
Mr-. Smith's consent
and
knowledge *
Findings of Fact Paragraph 15:
There i s i 10 proof
Plaintiff f s medical condition arose during the marriage.
unsubstantiated.

tha t the
This is

Findings of Fact Paragraph 16:
The Court did not find th.ii. the
Plaintiff terminated her eiitp] oyment because of the wishes and
desires of the Defendant.
Findings of Fact Paragraph 17: The Court determined that Plaintiff
was entitled to alimony•
The remainder of paragraph
"
part -f tl" "-urt's findings.
Decree of Li voice Paragraph . i
:»v -niy proolem with Paragraph 14
o' the Decree is that I don *t believe it is necessary.
If thos^; in n r i c a t i o n s were ma-.*
r; * have ci problem with them.
Since:

Attorney
cc :

at

rw]^ | i

Law
IIIIH i ( 11,

-. . j..::ngs and Decree I would

APPENDIX D

Brent E. Johns, Bar No. 1705
Attorney for Plaintiff
2411 Kiesel Avenue, Suite 101
Ogden, Utah 84401-2391
Telephone: (801) 394-5581
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KAYLENE S. SMITH,
Plaintiff

WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL

vs.
CIVIL NO. 910000459DA
ODELL M. SMITH, JR.,
Judge:

Clint S. Judkins

Defendant
COMES NOW attorney Brent E. Johns, and hereby withdraws as
counsel for the Defendant herein to become effective immediately.
day of October, 1992

DATED this

Brent E. Johns/
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Withdrawal to Jeff R. Thorne, Attorney for Plaintiff, at P.O. Box
876, Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876, and to Odell Smith, Defendant,
at 70 jNorth 200 East, Brigham City, Utah 843C)2, postage pre-paid
this /^fk, day of October, 1992
'//

/ yo7y£ i

ecretary

APPENDIX E

LAW

OFFICES

MANN, HADFIELD AND

THORNE

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
REED W. HADFIELD

Z I O N S BANK

JEFF R. THORNE

BUILDING

9 3 NORTH

BEN H. HADFIELD

MAIN

P. O. BOX
B R I G H A M CITY, UTAH
T E L E P H O N E (SOI)
FAX (SOI)

WALTER G. MANN, RETIRED

S76
84302-0876
723-3404

723-8807

October 5, 1992

Judge Clint S. Judkins
First District Court
Box Elder County Courthouse
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84302
Re:

Smith vs Smith, #910000459

Dear Judge Judkins:
Enclosed is a letter I sent to Brent Johns on September 24,
1992, together with a letter he sent to me dated October 1, 1992.
I have also enclosed a copy of the original Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.
It appears that we are not able to agree as to what should
be placed in the Findings and Conclusions; therefore, I am
submitting them to you for either signing or modification as you
see fit.
Very truly yours,
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE

By.
JRT/pj
Enclosures
p j / 1 : j judkins. Jcs

cc:

B r e n t E. Johns
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